Editors' Summary by The Editors
vii
Editors’ Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY held its eighty-
sixth conference in Washington, D.C., on September 11 and 12, 2008.
Several of the conference papers examine aspects of the current ﬁnancial
crisis: the relationships among recent global ﬁnancial imbalances, mort-
gage lending, and volatile commodity prices; the errors made by lenders in
judging subprime mortgages and instruments derived from them to have
fairly low credit risk; the effect of mortgage foreclosures on the dynam-
ics of home prices; the impact of mortgage credit losses on the supply of
credit; and the implications for ﬁnancial regulation of spillovers from fail-
ing ﬁnancial institutions. The remaining papers deal with the role of the
unofﬁcial economy in economic development, and the effect of an under-
valued currency on economic growth in developing countries. This issue
of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity presents the seven papers
from the conference, comments by the formal discussants, and synopses
of the discussions of the papers by conference participants.
In the ﬁrst paper, Ricardo Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier
Gourinchas make the case that outsized international capital ﬂows, the U.S.
subprime crisis, and recent swings in oil and other commodity prices are
interrelated phenomena. They argue that the root cause of all of these devel-
opments is a global scarcity of sound and liquid ﬁnancial assets relative to
the demand for such assets. As emerging market and commodity-producing
nations searched for ways to invest their newfound wealth, they focused
on U.S. ﬁnancial markets, their own being relatively underdeveloped. The
strong demand for U.S. assets pushed down required rates of return and cre-
ated an environment conducive to asset bubbles, with the expansion of sub-
prime lending and the rapid rise in home prices among the consequences.
However, market attempts to accommodate this excess demand for U.S.
assets contained the seeds of their own demise, because U.S. assets became
11472-00b_Editor's Summary_rev.qxd  3/6/09  12:13 PM  Page vii“stretched” to an unsustainable degree. Ultimately, the housing and ﬁnancial
bubbles collapsed. At that point, according to the authors, the continued
search for investment opportunities generated the dramatic run-up in com-
modity prices, especially oil. These new bubbles persisted until they weak-
ened global economic activity to the point that the underlying demand for
commodities receded.
In the view of the authors, these patterns will recur in some form as
long as rapidly growing developing economies remain ﬁnancially under-
developed and the chronic shortage of ﬁnancial assets persists. Only when
the world economy generates enough safe and proﬁtable stores of value to
meet the demand by savers will this cycle end.
The second paper asks why sophisticated analysts did not anticipate
that so many of the subprime mortgage loans and related assets they were
holding would perform badly. Kristopher Gerardi, Andreas Lehnert, Shane
Sherlund, and Paul Willen begin by showing that lenders made riskier loans
in 2005 and 2006 than earlier, with the key difference being an increase in
borrower leverage. However, they ﬁnd that the change in mortgage char-
acteristics was too small by itself to explain the recent surge in defaults.
Instead, defaults have been spurred by the collapse in home price appreci-
ation since early 2006.
To have misjudged the riskiness of subprime mortgages, then, lenders
must have been mistaken about future trends in home prices, the sensitiv-
ity of foreclosures to changes in home prices, or some combination of both.
Using data through 2004 only, the authors show that if analysts had known
the future trajectory of home prices, they could have predicted the large
rise in foreclosures with reasonable accuracy. Indeed, the authors’ reading
of research reports and media commentary by mortgage market analysts
between 2004 and 2006 suggests that these analysts had a reasonable sense
of the potential impact on the subprime market of home price declines. How-
ever, these analysts generally assigned a substantial price decline a very low
probability, apparently putting more weight on the historical rarity of such
events than on the risk posed by the unprecedented jump in home prices
during the preceding decade.
In the third paper, Karl Case explores the mechanisms through which
home prices are adjusting to restore equilibrium in the housing market.
He explains that two different mechanisms are at work today. One is the
traditional process in which prospective buyers search deliberately for
homes that best suit them, while homeowners are reluctant to sell at a
loss and thus tend to wait for better offers. This process generally restores
equilibrium slowly, through growth in the quantity of housing demanded,
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is auctions of homes acquired by banks and mortgage servicers through
default and foreclosure. This process leads to more abrupt price declines,
because institutional sellers are eager to move the properties off their bal-
ance sheets.
Case notes that both auctions and the traditional search mechanism have
played important roles in previous, regional housing slumps. With hous-
ing demand now falling sharply in many parts of the country, auctions are
becoming more common: between the third quarter of 2006 and November
2008, auctions climbed from 9 percent to 27 percent of total existing-home
sales. Case concludes that home prices may well decline substantially further
during the next few years, but he holds out hope that a faster turnaround
is possible.
Jan Hatzius, in the fourth paper, analyzes the implications of mortgage
losses for new lending. He estimates that if home prices fall an additional
15 percent from their level in mid-2008, total losses on residential mort-
gages will ultimately exceed $750 billion. About half of those losses will
likely be borne by leveraged ﬁnancial institutions in the United States,
greatly reducing those institutions’ equity capital. In addition, banks gen-
erally trim their desired leverage ratios when ﬁnancial and economic con-
ditions sour. All in all, Hatzius calculates that ﬁnancial institutions might
reduce their outstanding loans by more than $2 trillion from what they
would have been otherwise.
The supply of credit will take a further hit from the sharp drop in issuance
of asset-backed securities. Much-larger-than-expected losses on existing
securities have undermined confidence in the firms that bundle individ-
ual loans, and in the rating agencies that evaluate the risk of those secu-
rities, so demand has tumbled. Taking together the different channels of
reduced credit supply, Hatzius estimates that growth in aggregate demand
could be reduced (before allowing for any multiplier effects) by roughly
2.5 percentage points on average in 2008 and 2009. He emphasizes the
importance of government policies to boost private lending and to ensure
continued lending by the government-sponsored mortgage enterprises
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
In the fifth paper, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin reconsider the
basic strategy of financial regulation. They explain that the traditional
rationale for regulating financial institutions is to ensure their solvency
and thereby protect the interests of retail depositors. This rationale has
encouraged a focus on capital regulation in which the required capital
buffer depends on the riskiness of an institution’s assets. However, events
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the ﬁnancial system as a whole. The key problem is that actions taken by
financial institutions to protect their own solvency can have spillover
effects on other institutions; thus actions that are rational for individual
ﬁrms can be counterproductive for the overall economy.
Therefore, the goal of financial regulation should be to mitigate these
spillovers. One important type of spillover arises with assets that are not
risky themselves but are systemically important because of the way they
connect institutions. Drawing on an analysis of this interconnectedness,
the authors recommend two new elements of ﬁnancial regulation: a simple
(non-risk-adjusted) leverage constraint, and a liquidity requirement that
regulates the composition of asset portfolios rather than just their size.
In the sixth paper, Rafael La Porta and Andrei Shleifer examine the
“unofficial” or “informal” sector in developing economies. Unofficial
firms, which generally do not pay taxes or abide by regulations, account
for up to about half of economic activity in poor countries. However,
experts disagree about their role. In the “romantic” view, as deﬁned by La
Porta and Shleifer, unofﬁcial ﬁrms are similar to ofﬁcial ﬁrms but are held
back by legal barriers to ofﬁcial recognition and by lack of access to
ﬁnance. Government policy that aims at helping these ﬁrms enter the for-
mal sector would boost economic growth. In contrast, the “parasite” view
holds that unofﬁcial ﬁrms are too small to produce efﬁciently, but that the
cost advantage of avoiding taxes and regulations allows them to undercut
more-productive formal ﬁrms. From this perspective, eliminating unofﬁ-
cial ﬁrms would boost economic growth. Lastly, the “dual economy” view
agrees that unofﬁcial ﬁrms are inefﬁcient but does not view them as
threatening formal ﬁrms, because they are led by less-able entrepreneurs
and sell to different customers. If this is the correct view, government tax
and regulatory policy should support the formation of ofﬁcial ﬁrms but
should neither foster nor discourage unofﬁcial ﬁrms.
La Porta and Shleifer present evidence that supports the dual view over
the romantic and parasite views. According to their data, unofﬁcial ﬁrms
are small and unproductive relative to ofﬁcial ﬁrms. In addition, unofﬁcial
ﬁrms employ managers with signiﬁcantly less human capital, tend to use
less physical capital, exploit external finance to a lesser extent, and pay
their workers substantially less. Informal ﬁrms do not tend to become for-
mal as they grow, but instead remain in their separate markets. The authors
conclude that the existence of informal ﬁrms is important for poverty alle-
viation as long as the economy remains underdeveloped, but does not
contribute much to productivity gains or economic growth.
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effect of the real exchange rate on economic growth. Rodrik observes that
signiﬁcant overvaluation of a currency is widely viewed as a detriment to
growth, but that little consensus exists about the effects of undervaluation.
His empirical analysis ﬁnds that undervaluation boosts economic growth
just as strongly as overvaluation diminishes it. Noteworthy examples of this
positive relationship between undervaluation and growth include China,
India, some other Asian countries, and several African countries. How-
ever, undervaluation appears to be correlated with economic growth only
for developing countries and not for rich ones.
Rodrik proposes the following explanation for his results: Developing
countries suffer from institutional and market failures that hinder economic
activity in general and production of tradable goods in particular. Currency
undervaluation raises the domestic price of tradables relative to nontradables,
which provides an offsetting boost to the tradable goods sector. By undoing
the distortion away from tradable goods, undervaluation thus increases eco-
nomic growth. Eliminating the distortion directly would avoid the costs of
undervaluation but is often not feasible; an exchange rate policy of deliber-
ate undervaluation appears to provide a feasible alternative.
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